Introduction
This discussion critiques the generally accepted doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy prevalent in contemporary constitutional states, including the doctrine as conceived in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
The critique proceeds from the view that law, more specifically positive law is essentially two-dimensional. On the one hand there is the dimension of justice; that is, law's justice, moral or critical dimension (and requisite). On the other hand there is law's factual dimension (and requisite). Both of these dimensions are essential for an individual norm to qualify as a norm of positive law. By the same token, on a comprehensive basis both dimensions are also essential requisites for a system of law to be in place. A clear understanding of the two-dimensionality of law provides the basis for the critique presented in the present discussion, which is focussed upon the factual dimension of law. It will be pointed out that the leading doctrine on the rule of law and constitutional supremacy prevalent in contemporary constitutional states is premised on a failure to account for the factual dimension; and that the doctrine in consequence obscures a clear insight into the factual dimension of law, and therefore obscures a clear understanding of the nature and content of (positive) law, including the constitution.
In Part 2 of this discussion law's two-dimensionality is expounded in brief with the specific purpose of elucidating the essential nature of the factual dimension. In part 3 important conceptual instruments in support of the arguments developed in this article Let me stress at the outset that this discussion is not focussed on the interpretation of the norm formulations of the recognised sources of positive law by their authorised interpreters (which would obviously include the judiciary but also organs of the executive, the legislature and the state administration). Instead, the discussion is focussed on the actual conduct of sectors of government and the public, who do not (necessarily) claim to interpret these formulations or to have interpretive authority in terms of the recognised sources of positive law, but who, through their conduct, render existing law ineffective and in some cases replace it with new (substituting) law, as explained below.
Law's two-dimensionality
The notion of regarding law as basically two-dimensional has a long history. The basic contours of such a two-dimensional understanding of law might be as ancient as legal reflection itself.
In the first place, it must be pointed out that any concept of law without the notion of justice would be impossible. At the very beginning of the Digest (of Justinian's Corpus Iuris Civilis) the essential connection between law and justice (ius and iustitia) is proclaimed. With reference to the view of the classical jurist, Celsus, that the law is the art of goodness and fairness, 2 jurists are called upon to:
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The discussion does not subscribe to any one specific school of thought in legal philosophy. It draws substantively from the ideas emanating from Scandinavian and American Realism, but not to the complete exclusion of trends within either positivist (analytical) or natural law thinking. Besides, looking upon law as basically two-dimensional as outlined here rules out both exclusive accord with as well as total rejection of any specific concept within the broader corpus of legal philosophy.
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In the second place, it is necessary to cast light on the factual dimension of law alluded to above. This dimension relates to the factor of effectiveness, the essential importance of which has been highlighted all along as an equally fundamental dimension of and prerequisite for positive law.
There is a widely held view that the proclamation of norms (norm-formulations in terms of the views developed in the discussion in part 3) by political authorities on their own is not sufficient to establish new law or to change existing law. This view goes back to at least the twelfth century Benedictine monk, Gratian, the author of the Concordantia Discordantium Canonum (c 1140), which formed the basis of the Corpus Iuris Canonici. In the beginning of the Concordantia it is stated that: "'Laws are established through promulgation and validated when they are approved by the acceptance of the people." 10 Hence, the promulgation of a law alone was not sufficient to turn it into law. It first had to be approved through the acceptance of it by those destined to be affected by it. As long as it remains unaccepted, it does not assume the status as a law. The Glossator, Azo (d 1220) echoed the same view when he stated that custom arising after a written law had been established could abrogate such written law. Commenting on Digest 1.3.32, 11 the Glossator jurist from Bologna, Odofredus (d 1265) maintained that the Roman people could still make law, and that their customs could therefore still annul existing law. 12 In this regard it is of particular importance to note what Thomas of Aquinas (1225 Aquinas ( -1274 had to say in "Treatise on Law" which is part of his magnum opus, Summa Theologiae. Thomas expanded on the work of the Civilian jurists since the beginnings of the Glossator school. According 11 Digest 1.3.32 reads as follows: "Age-entrusted custom is not undeservedly cherished as having almost statutory force, and this is to be the kind of law which is said to be established by use and wont. For given that statutes themselves are binding upon us for no other reason than that they have been accepted by the judgment of the populace, certainly it is fitting that what the populace has approved without any writing shall be binding upon everyone. What does it matter whether the populace declares its will by voting or by the very substance of its actions? Accordingly, it is absolutely right to accept the point that statutes may be replaced not only by vote of the legislature but also by the silent agreement of everyone expressed through desuetude. to him custom could and did create, abolish (change) and interpret law. 13 To Thomas it was of particular importance that law could be created and changed (or abolished) fundamentally in two ways: firstly by words, and secondly by action. In the first case, law is laid down by the express promulgation thereof by a designated political authority who formulated new law (in words). In the second case, law could be lived by those to whom the law applies, by their consistently acting in a particular way. 14 Specifically with regard to the changing of law, quite obviously including the changing of written law through consistent action, Thomas stated:
Wherefore it is sometimes possible to act beside the law; namely, in a case where the law fails, yet the act will not be evil. And when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, the custom shows that the law is no longer useful: just as it might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary.
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Such customary action contrary to officially promulgated existing written law does not amount to unlawful action but rather marks the fact that the officially existing law is no longer fitting. Instead of being unlawful (gauged against the yardstick of the officially existing formulations of the norms of law) the new customary action constitutes, supersedes and abolishes the officially existing written law and creates new law in its place. 16 This obviously happens tacitly and is not overtly articulated as in the case of changes by way of written formulation. This, however, does not detract from the fact that it has the same consequence as amendments of written 14 Thus he declared as follows in Summa Theologiae 1.2.97.3: "Now all law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver… Now just as human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest by speech, so it might be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution. But it is evident that by human speech, law can be both changed and expounded, in so far as it manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if they be repeated, so as to make a custom, law can be changed and expounded; and also something can be established which obtains force of law, in so far as by repeated external actions, the inward movement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectively declared, for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has the force of law, abolishes law and is the interpreter of law." (Quoted by Van Drunen Law and Custom [37] [38] It flows as just as much from what we have said that an earlier may not be abrogated only by a later law, but also by custom. It made no difference whether the people declared its wish by vote or by its very acts and doings. It has therefore very rightly been recognised that laws might be done away with or changed not only by the vote of the lawgiving power but also through disuse with the silent consent of everybody. It follows that this cannot be prevented by the clause not infrequently found, especially in municipal laws -"Custom to the contrary notwithstanding". These words must be taken as applying merely to past customs, and not to others to be brought in later. No private person can make a law for himself in his testament so as to disable himself from changing his earlier will. And owing to the constant change of times and manners, laws do not forever remain praiseworthy by reason of benefit like that with which they were originally brought into force. Thus it would clearly be incongruous to want to secure by a law that it should not be reshaped for the better whether by new laws or new customs such as right reason might recommend.
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Many contemporary conceptions of law also in some way or other subscribe to this two-dimensionality. 21 Hence, the assertion by the prominent contemporary legal passages in the Codex and the Digest (amongst others D 1. 32. 3) that laws were abrogated not only by the will of the legislator, but also with the tacit consent of the populus. rather the fact that it provides the basis for a reliable ontology of law in tune with the long-standing tradition briefly outlined above. The dual nature of law suggests two interrelated yet distinguishable themes of reflection on and research into the essential nature of positive law, one pertaining to the ideal or justice dimension and the other to the real dimension. As noted above, the present discussion, in which I shall try to clarify the factual requisite of law, is focussed mainly on the factual or real dimension.
First, however, I need to juxtapose these two sub-inquiries by comparing some typical questions as well as the typical conditions in which the questions relating to these subinquiries will tend to arise. In doing so I hope, among other things, to cast light on the relevance of the questions that I seek to deal with, not only from a purely theoretical point of view but also from a practical perspective.
Inquiries on the ideal (or justice) dimension
The ideal dimension of law enquires into the degree of law's tolerance for injustice. A typical question that arises in this inquiry is how unjust a specific rule of "law" must be before it forfeits its claim to be law in terms of the ideal standards of law. On a comprehensive or systemic scale, the question is how unjust a "legal order" must be Such a state may have good legal formulations, radiating justice and thus meeting the ideal element of law, yet severely lack compliance with the norm-formulations, in consequence of which it might forfeit the claim to be recognised as a legal system.
Conceptual clarification: legal norms and legal norm-formulations
The terms legal norm/s and legal norm-formulation/s are crucial for the present discussion and will often be used. 28 They are not equivalents, and it is important that their meaning and the distinction between them be clarified. 29 Legal normformulations are primarily a question of language. They constitute a distinctive mode of language, namely normative language which essentially seeks to articulate norms, even though they are not necessarily expressly phrased in normative terms. Typical of sentences that articulate such normative language is that they are susceptible to expressions in typical normative terms, such as the words "ought," "must," "may," "is required", "obligatory," "right", "permit to", "forbidden to", etc are featuring 30 -these words all have the same function in common, namely the function of a normative operator. 31 The crucial point for the present discussion is that these norm-formulations are prescriptive but not descriptive in nature. They differ in their epistemological character from descriptive sentences in that, unlike descriptive sentences, they do not assert facts. They are not true or false depending on whether or not they correspond with the social facts to which they refer, but rather valid or invalid, 32 depending on 28 Legal norms and legal norm-formulation/s are used here as encompassing terms which refer to rules, principles, institutions of law, prohibitions, directives and permissions; more specifically, to norms and norm-formulations of constitutional law. Legal norms as conceived in this discussion are not dependent on express formulation, however. Actual legal norms sometimes do appear in linguistic form. They can exist without ever having been formulated in linguistic terms. 36 It must in principle be 33 As explained for example in the systems of both Kelsen and Hart. 34 Niiniluotu "Truth and Legal Norms" 175. A norm-formulation can also be viewed as something that, depending on whether or not it is adhered to, may be true or false: true, when it is followed and thus describing the actual state of social reality; and false, when it is not followed, and thus not representing social reality. possible, however, to express them in the form of linguistic utterances, which can be represented through prescriptive or norm-expressive sentences. 37 Hence, a legal norm may be in existence in the absence of express formulation. As long as the members of a community habitually act in a particular way (usus) in the belief that they are legally bound to do so (opinio iuris), a legal norm, more particularly a norm of customary law, is in existence. Legal norms of this customary kind distinctively account for the descriptive (factual) property of law, since legal norms owe their existence to actual social conduct without the formal (linguistic) stamp of a preceding legal formation.
The basic thesis of the factual requisite of law
Given that legal norms as conceived above have an essential factual element, that is, The results of such research may reveal the following:
(a) Actual behaviour closely corresponds with a legal norm-formulation.
Transgressing behaviour occurs only by exception, but it is effectively remedied 37 Koller 2014 Ratio Iuris 157.
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Any social research that could cast light on the degree of compliance or non-compliance with law could be relevant. This includes sociological and political science research as well the observations of sharp and experienced political commentators and journalists. In the final analysis, jurists have a dual part to play in research of this kind: first, to identify law (legal norm-formulations) that is suspect for its non-compliance, which will then further demand the attention of the experts; secondly, to consider on the basis of the results of such research whether or not a norm is in fact in place (ie, taking into account the level of compliance) or has been replaced by new substituting law, or has simply fallen by the wayside as explained below.
by measures of enforcement as described in the norm-formulations. In that case, the formulations provide a reliable description of the actual state of law as articulated in the legal norm-formulations concerned. The transgressing behaviour is actually unlawful in terms of the existing norm-formulations.
(b) A norm-formulation is transgressed on a large scale. The transgressors' flouting of the norm-formulations is accompanied by regular and consistent deviating behaviour (usus) and the deviators, moreover, regard themselves as being legally bound to act in the way they are acting (opinio iuris). In that case, such behaviour constitutes a new substituting norm and therefore new substituting law. In that scenario it is my contention that the legal norm-formulation in question does not reliably signify a legal norm (existing positive law) any more.
The norm has then lapsed because its requisite factual dimension has fallen by the wayside and it has, moreover, been replaced by new, substituting law.
(c) A norm-formulation is transgressed on a fairly large scale. However, unlike the situation in the second scenario the transgression is not accompanied by consistent and regular deviating conduct and / or the deviators do not believe that they are legally bound to act in the various deviating ways in which they are in fact acting. Still, unlike the situation in the first scenario, enforcement might be haphazard, thus allowing deviators to get away with their transgressions. The purported norm (law) as described in the norm-formation is in part unsettled but unlike the situation in the second scenario, no new norm and therefore no new law has come into being. In that case there is legal uncertainty. A legal lacuna, or non liquet, that is, an area not regulated by an existing legal norm of positive law -a legal no-man's-land -is opening up.
In principle this thesis is equally applicable to the norm-formulations in a supreme constitution, which, like law in general, are also not immune from the operation of the factual dimension.
The current doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy
It should now be apparent that there is a tension between the factual requisite of law as enunciated in the present discussion on the one hand, and on the other hand the doctrine of the rule of law, the supremacy of the constitution. More specifically, it should be clear that insight into the factual dimension of law gives the lie to essential claims of the prevalent doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy. As the discussion of the thesis of the factual requisite further proceeds, the outlines of the tension will become clearer. It will be argued that the doctrine is inappropriate because it impairs instead of promotes insight into the nature of law as such, and more specifically because it obscures a reliable insight into the actual state of the law at any given time, on the stability of law, and on how law changes.
This argumentation should, however, not be regarded an assault on the notions of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy as such, as these notions are indispensable for well-functioning legal orders and the effective legal protection of individuals and communities. However, the notions of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy also assume the character of a comprehensive doctrine which does not only fulfil the proper function of signifying the complex of norm formulations of law and the constitutional order, but also improperly purports to describe the actual state of the law and the constitution. In that capacity they assume the character of a descriptive doctrine instead of a notional framework comprising the core norm-formulations of a political society (currently mainly the state). In doing so they thwart the acquisition of reliable insight into the actual state of the law that would emerge only from a clear understanding of the dual nature of law in general and the factual prerequisite of law in particular. Moreover, the doctrine of the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution may also be functioning as a soothing yet deceptive device, beguiling people into believing that what is proclaimed in the formulations of the law and the supreme constitution is a reliable reflection of the actual state of the law, while that might in fact not be so.
In the following part of this article I first set out the triad of beliefs upon which the doctrine is based. Thereafter I discuss the linguistic strategy -the doctrine's language -that is enlisted to inculcate trust in the doctrine. These beliefs are now explained.
The omnipresence of positive law as expressed in its legal norm-formulations
The law, more particularly positive law, captured in the relevant norm-formulations, is viewed as an omnipresent system of legal precepts in terms of which all human behaviour can be measured, controlled and remedied. The view is specifically statecentered, since the conviction is that the state institutions designated by the normformulations of the constitution as law-making bodies (mainly the legislature, and to a limited extent the executive -through subordinate legislation and administrative rule-making) and the courts (through judicial interpretation) entirely exhaust the function of law-making and changing the law. Beyond that, the belief is not only that no law may be made or changed but that no law is in fact made or changed. Yes, the norm-formulations are interpreted by the designated interpreters, but that gives meaning to what is imminent in the text; it obviously does not replace the formulations. The claim of the omnipresence of law logically stems from the doctrine of the rule of law. The law forfeits its claim to any capability to rule in favour of forces beyond the control of law. 39 39
It should be quite obvious that that is so because state courts never proclaim a non liquet; they never say that they have run out of legal answers. A court might rule a matter moot or as yet not ripe for adjudication, but it never says that there is no law that can provide answers. If it does it inflicts a death blow to the doctrine of the rule of law. An adjunct to this is the conviction that the This belief accords with the generally avowed premise upon which present-day constitutional states are based. This premise is so firmly inculcated that it tends to be generally assumed without reflection. Occasionally, however, it is explicitly articulated.
Ronald Dworkin's exposition of law provides arguably the purest and best known exposition of the omnipresence of positive law. Dworkin proposes that law consists of principles alongside rules that enable law to maintain such a lacuna-free omnipresence that the need for exercising a discretion simply never arises. There are in all cases principles capable of providing a legally-based correct solution. 40 Aharon Barak's view of law is similar. Barak declares: "Our universe is full of fundamental principles. There is no corner of our lives not controlled by them." 41 Barak further declares that every dispute is normatively justiciable and then elaborates as follows:
Every legal problem has criteria for its resolution. There is no "legal vacuum."
According to my outlook law fills the whole world. There is no sphere containing no law and no legal criteria. Every human act is encompassed in the world of law. Every act can be "imprisoned" in the framework of the law. Even actions of a clearly political nature -such as waging of war -can be examined with legal criteria, as evidenced by the laws of war in international law. The mere fact that an issue is "political" -that is, (seemingly) predominantly political or could have far-reaching political consequences -does not mean that it cannot be resolved by a court of law. Everything can be resolved by a court in the sense that law can take a view as to its legality. 42 law is capable of providing a (legally-based) correct answer to all questions. That is not to say that the answers would always be correct, but if incorrect, it would not be law's fault but that of the erring, misinterpreting decision-maker. These views are at the root of the dominant doctrine on the rule of law and constitutional supremacy. These views, more particularly those of Dworkin, have drawn sharp criticism from
Hart, who in my view quite aptly described Dworkin as "the most noble dreamer of them all for his (Dworkin's) belief that the norm complex of law was sufficient to provide a right answer for all legal questions, thus avoiding the need ever to resort to discretion". See Hart "American Jurisprudence" 138-141. If conceded that the populace or forceful sections of the populace could change the law directly, the principle of constitutional supremacy would succumb to its direct opposite, namely popular sovereignty (or merely to unbound political force) and thus the rule of law would succumb to sociopolitical forces that trump the law. For the tension between constitutional supremacy and popular sovereignty see Malan 2015 THRHR 248-268. independently in terms of its own rules, and independent of forces outside the corpus of law.
In relationship with these realties is distinctively active. The law is regarded as being signified in the norm-formulations and as being effectively in control of these realities.
It regulates, commands and standardises all conduct of those under its jurisdiction, including the conduct of the agencies of the state. The law (as signified in the formulations) is in itself the supreme social reality. This belief is captured in the notion of the supremacy of the law, at present most prominently in the refined modification of legal supremacy, namely constitutional supremacy as encapsulated in modern state constitutions. 48 The supreme constitution is believed to be actively regulating not only the law outside the constitution (mainly legislation) but also social reality. The notion of legal (and constitutional) supremacy highlights three intertwined dimensions of (positive) law, namely its constitutive, descriptive (truth) and prognostic dimensions.
The norm-formulations are regarded as reliable reflections of the actual state of the law. In its turn the law, mirror-imaged in the formulations, is the supreme social reality that actually regulates these realities. Conditioned by the doctrine of supremacy of the constitution, norm-formulations that are prescriptive (contained in prescriptive sentences) undergo an epistemological metamorphosis and become descriptive; that is, sentences that (pretend to) describe social realities (truths the bold claim of the supreme constitution: namely, that to subject political power effectively to the law in fact makes law impervious to it. Even in the face of strong evidence that is not the case -that is, that the "supreme" constitution has been overcome by political forces that are stronger than the constitution -they still stick to the belief in the supreme law of the constitution. The conviction is that the normformulations of the constitution are actually ruling, and will be ruling in future. Dutch jurist J Van der Hoeven thus states:
The constitutionalists seek to achieve their objectives on account of a very high value that is placed upon written law. They are convinced that human conduct, including conduct by government, can be regulated by legal norms. 53 (Own translation)
With reference to the position in the United States, Griffin goes on to say:
Lawyers tend to regard the Constitution as a set of ultimate normative standards appropriate for judging any political practice. The Constitution occupies so much normative space that it is hard to see anything else. The Constitution is "a machine that (goes) of itself" and policy disasters and even constitutional crises are not evidence of a failure of the document, but only that Americans have failed its high expectations.
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This assertion is in fact equally applicable to many other states, particularly also to South Africa since the beginning of the constitutional transition in 1994.
To the extent that the realities are incongruent with the norm-formulations, the effect of the law would be to change such realities in order to conform with the formulations.
Hence, to the extent that norm-formulations do not as yet describe social realities, they would at least be correcting and thus (re)constituting these realities so as to bring them into step with the norm-formulations. Legal norm-formulations that do not describe social realities would therefore at least reliably predict future realities.
The doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy is hard-pressed (in principle as a matter of fact) not to make the following concessions that would unsettle it. In the legal ideology of the liberal constitutional state the privilege to call something "law" is strictly reserved for designated institutions. Freedom means the supreme rule of law and only of the law. Custom is no autonomous but at most a derivative source of law. 55 (Own translation) Not to do so would, on close analysis, allow people to take the law into their own hands 56 and thus for law to be made, undone or replaced by the actors other than those bodies designated by the state constitution to make, change and interpret the law.
It should therefore be obvious that any concession enabling sectors of the public or state agencies acting outside their official mandates to make binding law would be out of the question. the supremacy of law to the uncertain vagaries brought about by other social forces and even to the reign of one or more such forces. In that way the foundation of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy would make a self-defeating concession to legal realism and to unbridled politics that is beyond the control of the law, thus surrendering the principle of the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution to the volatility of socio-political forces. 57
The doctrine's faith-strengthening language
Being formulations, legal norm-formulations essentially exist in language. Legal normformulations constitute the language of law. They consist of ought-propositions, that is, prescriptive propositions that set out ideal types of conduct on how those under the jurisdiction of the legal order concerned should be acting and correspondingly ideal situations that would be in existence if they would be acting as required in the norm-formulations. Legal language on close analysis is specifically not a complex of descriptive propositions. Thus Karl Olivecrona aptly observed that legal language is not a descriptive but a directive, influential language. 58 Hence, as already shown in 3 above, norm formulations are not descriptive, asserting and thus being true or false (depending on whether or not they correspond with the social facts they refer to), but rather valid or invalid. 59 In line with this, specifically in the field of constitutional law, Lawrence Boulle remarks that constitutionalism -the doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy -is a prescriptive and not a descriptive doctrine that indicates how state power should be exercised and not how it is actually exercised in practice. 60 However, in spite of its essential normative character, legal language has a distinctive inclination to misrepresent that which is normative as if it were describing social realities, that is, as if it were describing facts. This we may call the doctrine's language.
What happens is that normative sentences take on a descriptive mode, being written and read as social realities. that people ought to act in a particular way towards other people. Olivecrona also spotted this phenomenon of prescriptive or ideal formulations often being draped in the phraseology of factual rather than normative sentences, 62 thus pretending to be descriptive while disguising the contents of such sentences as social facts. In turn Llewellyn notes that normative legal sentences quite regularly have a descriptive appearance, 63 and that they thus purport or pretend that whatever is required in the norm-formulations is actually happening and so constitutes an actual reality. He states:
I think that such precept-on-the-books... tacitly contains an element of pseudo description along with its statement of what officials ought to do; a tacit statement that officials do act according to the tenor of the rule; a tacit prediction that officials will act according to its tenor. 64 Kelsen also recognised this deceptive propensity of norm-formulations to assume the guise of factual descriptions. 65 As noted above, a statement that someone has a right to something has the appearance of a factual statement that purports to describe a factual situation. When for example a constitution or human rights instrument states that everyone has the right to equality, human dignity, life or freedom of movement, etc such statements are seemingly not normative. In this regard see communicate this deceptive factual message that those exposed to them tend to trust the message and to believe in the actual existence of such factually represented conditions. Hence, these formulations act as a means by which (abstract) normformulations (ideals) are assigned an almost tangible (factual) existence. In consequence, as Olivecrona argues, the formulations may be regarded as transposing agents between the real (or factual) world in which there are no supreme constitutions, rights and duties, and a super-tangible world where these things are so in existence. 67 Norm-formulations therefore have the propensity of purporting to describe a pleasingly salutary law-abiding reality, something which these formulations are obviously not capable of achieving, regardless of whatever rhetorical strategies might be employed in seeking to achieve it. As Llewellyn quite bluntly yet not without merit asserts:
"Rights" adds nothing to descriptive power. But it gives a specious appearance of substance to prescriptive rules. They seem to be about something.
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Drawing on the terms proposed in 3 above, in the eyes of those exposed to the doctrine's language norm-formulations transpose the conduct required in such formulations into actual realities. In so doing this language acts as faith-strengthening rhetoric convincing the reader that the norm-formulations describe factual truths, 69
(that is, that they create and sustain actual realities of whatever is articulated in such formulations). Hence, the doctrine's language is premised on the (tacit) belief that it has the ability to create effects merely on account of articulating such (desired) The constitutional discourse specifically also in South Africa is permeated with such faithstrengthening language widely used among lawyers and the general public such as rights that are guaranteed, entrenched or enshrined in the Constitution, and these rights are referred to as constitutional guarantees. The Constitution itself is described as entrenched or enshrined.
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Ironically the effect of norms being portrayed as facts is to expose the trite doctrine of the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution to the same classical criticism that has always been levelled against natural law -namely that they confuse the is-es with the oughts and portray the latter as if they were the former. In order to acquire a reliable indication of the actual content of the law and the constitution, the socio-political realities have to be studied. Hence, the actual behaviour of politicians, the state administration and the public in general has to be assessed. The extent of actual compliance or deviation from the norm-formulations,
and not the legal norm-formulations themselves, will reveal the actual changing content of the law at any given time. Therefore I agree with Llewellyn that:
…the most significant aspects of the relations of law and society lie in the field of behaviour, and that words take on importance either because and insofar as they are behaviour, or because and insofar as they demonstrably reflect or influence other behaviour.
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In consequence, the field of study of law should go way beyond the legal norm- the law. 75 If one suspects that the norm-formulations do not reveal a reliable picture of the totality of the law and that such a complete picture might be forthcoming only once the socio-political forces are also explored, yet proceeds to limit oneself to the formulations as if they were the only sources, legal science would descend into mere dogma or doctrine. 76 The scientific endeavour has then been undertaken on a basis that does not pursue knowledge and insight but prohibits it. Thus, Ehrlich is of the view that the methods employed by modern legal science cause substantial parts of the law to become unknown (or obscured). 77
In the field of constitutional law, Griffin warns that the disregard of non-textual changes to the constitution could weaken one's insight into the actual functioning of the constitutional dispensation. Griffin "Constitutionalism in the United States" 56.
... whether the coercive machinery the "state" provides for coercion on behalf of those legal norms, and whether it has such a power that on the average it can be expected that the legal norm will be fulfilled.
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Important as the coercion might be for law's effectiveness and hence for law's factual dimension, it is wrong to over emphasize the coercive measures of agencies of the state as if that were the primary factor for securing the effectiveness of law and thus for sustaining law's factual dimension. Edgar Bodenheimer levels criticism against this approach which he refers to as an academic preoccupation with sanctions which leads to a false view of the law. 80 The overemphasis on coercion by state agencies stems from a view of the law in terms of which too much is ascribed to the state, not only in regard to the making of law but also in regard to its effectiveness. In this respect I am in agreement with Peter Koller, who is of the opinion that the factual dimension is based on widespread acceptance and voluntary behaviour. 81 I am also in agreement with Edgar Bodenheimer, in whose opinion coercion is meaningless and the threat of coercion impotent if the majority of the populace are unwilling to obey the law. 82 Bodenheimer maintains that the primary guarantee for the efficacy of a legal order must be the acceptance by the community and that compulsive sanctions are merely secondary and auxiliary. In this regard he states as follows:
A reasonable and satisfactory system of law will be obeyed by most members of the community… Compulsion is used against a non-cooperative minority; in any normal and effectively working commonwealth the number of lawbreakers against whom sanctions must be employed is much smaller than the number of law-abiding citizens.
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Voluntariness and consensus are the backbone of a well-functioning legal order. Thus
Bodenheimer is spot on in stating:
We are justified, therefore, in taking the position that the necessity for primary reliance on government force as a means for carrying out the mandates of law indicates a malfunctioning of the legal system rather than an affirmation of its validity and efficacy. Since we should not define a legal system in terms of its pathological manifestations, we should not see the essence of law in the use of compulsion.
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If on close analysis of the socio-political realities it is established that a legal normform formulation is not factually effective, because of a lack of voluntary compliance or because of major glitches in the coercive apparatus of the state, or of both, the conclusion should be that there is in fact no norm and therefore no positive law on the issue that is articulated in the norm-formulation in question. In that scenario law is devoid of its factual dimension, which is one indispensable half of law's dual wholeness. This is but a half-reality, namely only the ideal or critical side -only the norm-formulations -while the factual or real side -actual effective norms -which is the other vital half of law, is absent. Since the simultaneous presence of both dimensions is required to constitute law, there is no law at all.
In analysing the socio-political realities, two points of focus might be distinguished. In the first place, the spotlight is on the behaviour of public office-bearers; that is, broadly on government and the public administration. In the second place, the spotlight is cast on the behaviour of (segments of) the public in general vis-à-vis the norm- 
Substituting law arising from the behaviour of public office-bearers
In scenarios of this kind, the conduct of public office-bearers, in particular of officials who are part of the state administration, shows a pattern of deviation in conflict with the norms of positive law as articulated in the relevant legal norm-formulations. The deviating conduct assumes a fixed pattern either not yet provided for or clearly disallowed by the legal norm-formulations of positive law. In pursuing the new practice office-bearers genuinely judge themselves to be legally bound to follow that pattern;
that is, to behave in that particular manner because they ought to do so. Hence, their actual behaviour -usus -is accompanied by opinio iuris. Once that occurs, new substituting law comprising both the factual and the ideal components of law's dual structure is quite obviously in the process of being created. Its establishment can be prevented only if effective measures to enforce the law articulated in the legal normformulations (which is now under pressure from the substituting new practice) can still be taken. However, if the relevant state agencies are not able to do that, or if they are acquiescent in such behaviour, thus tacitly consenting thereto (tacitus consensus superioris) 85 the disobeyed norm lapses into non-existence. In the latter case, the new law replaces the old one with government as a passive, participating party. The old law ceases to exist as part of positive law and is replaced by the new law that has resulted from consistent, deviating conduct. If the old norm was part of the constitution, it ceases to be part of it, and is by the same token replaced by new constitutional law that has arisen from consistent deviating conduct. The replaced law may be called substituted law and the new law substituting law. This substitution occurs in spite of the fact that the norm-formulation that purports to signify an effective norm of positive law is still there. It also occurs in spite of asserting the constitution's supremacy and relying on a stability that forbids constitutional amendments or allows for constitutional amendments only upon compliance with strict amendment procedures. The norm-formulation in this scenario is misleading, because it is a misrepresentation of the law that is actually in existence. The substitution that has taken place is not reflected in the legal norm-formulations that still have the appearance of the substituted instead of the substituting law. What has occurred in this scenario is that the law has changed without the legal formulation (the text) having effectuated such a change.
Lapsed law resulting from the behaviour of public office-bears
In this scenario, public office bearers transgress the norm articulated in legal normformulation on a large scale without, as in the first scenario, engaging in consistent deviating behaviour. Or there may be consistency in their deviating behaviour, yet without the bona fide belief that they are legally bound to act in that way. There is usus but no accompanying opinio iuris. In this scenario, the existing law lapses without having been replaced by new law and a legal vacuum, that is, a field not governed by any positive law -a non liquet -is opening up. Since government -the legislature 85 Insightfully explained by Van den Bergh Wet en Gewoonte 39.
and the executive -might be acquiescent in such behaviour and thus be consenting to it, there is consensus superioris, which means that government is passively a party to such law, which may include the lapsing of "supreme" constitutional law into nonexistence.
Substituting or lapsed law arising from the behaviour of (segments of the) public
What occurs in this scenario is not different in principle from what happens in the previous two, yet is arguably even more incongruent with the trite doctrine of the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution because the collective agent that creates substituting law or causes existing law to lapse is not agencies of the state but segments of the public; that is, the source of the substituting law, or of the law's falling by the wayside due to conduct is not only the law-making and law-changing This view of the fate of law invokes the perspective that positive law and a well-functioning constitutional state presuppose the existence of a "perfect" imbalance of forces between the existing positive law on the one hand and the forces that either transgress without necessarily trying to replace the existing law (eg crime) or forces that expressly seek to replace it (forces that seek to destabilise the government and / or the state). Once the challenging forces grow stronger, and compliance with the existing law gets haphazard, resulting from less voluntary adherence and / or weaker enforcement by state agencies, that imbalance gets unsettled and the relationship moves in the direction of a balance of these forces, which causes the gradual lapse of the "existing" law or, depending on the strength and success of the challenging forces, constituting new recognised law and the constitution. A reliable reflection of the actual constitution must therefore account for these non-formally recognised practices. 90 It is significant that in spite of his pure theory of law that limits the analysis of positive law to the norms validly ordained by designated organs of state to make and amend law, Hans Kelsen expressly acknowledges the operation of the factual dimension in his analysis of the positive law. It might even be more apt to say that Kelsen, in spite of his pure theory of law, cannot in the final analysis escape the law-creating and lawsubstituting force of the factual dimension when he acknowledged that the validity of norms depends in part on their effectivity, so that there has to be at least a minimum degree of obedience of the law for the law to remain valid. 91 Hence, a norm that is never obeyed is no longer valid 92 and therefore ceases to be a norm of positive law.
It is possible, says Kelsen, that a norm may forfeit its validity due to consistent disobedience. Kelsen declares:
If effectiveness in the developed sense is the condition for validity not only for the legal order as a whole but also for a single legal norm, then the law creating function of custom cannot be excluded by statutory law, at least not as far as the negative function of desuetude is concerned.
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The same is true for Hart, who formulates (t)wo minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the one hand those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials.
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JAG Griffith is specifically alive to the operation of the force of the factual dimension.
He maintains that everything done in the belief that legally it ought to be done (that is, with the necessary opinio iuris, which has a binding effect on people, is (included One need not believe in rule-of-law constitutionalism to think that the changes in the role of the national government in the regulation of the economy proposed by President Roosevelt were so fundamental that they should have been authorized through appropriate constitutional amendments. The New Deal changes were likely the most significant changes in the constitutional system made in the twentieth century, yet one cannot tell from the text of the Constitution that any changes occurred at all.
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Hence, new law, including new constitutional law, may be in existence in place of the substituted law long before it is actually realised that the change has in fact taken place. 99 In a state in which the leading socio-political forces underpin the legal norm- But here is the rub -the first rub: at the moment of their promulgation the legal normformulations might correctly reflect social behaviour. However, from the time of their promulgation there might be discrepancies between the dominant socio-political forces and the accompanying behaviour by office-bearers and segments of the public, the latter being underpinned by dominant socio-political forces in the politico-
Griffin "Constitutionalism in the United States" 51.
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Van den Bergh Wet en Gewoonte 42.
constitutional dispensation concerned, but not reflected in the norm-formulations. In that case, the legal norm-formulations might reflect a misrepresentation of the law from the moment of their promulgation.
Here one has to be alive to the fact that the legal norm-formulations at the time of their promulgation reliably record the actual socio-political forces and accompanying behaviour does not mean that the formulations will remain such a reliable record in future because legal language -legal norm-formulations -are directive and influential, as Olivecrona has reminded us (and as we have seen in parts 3 and 5.2), 100 yet not able to arrest and rigidify existing socio-political forces and social behaviour. 101 The law, more specifically the constitution, operating in the domain of politics, is particularly prone to changing power relations and social behaviour. For that reason it might reliably record the power relations of the immediate past 102 yet be unable to predict the future. Norm-formulations might be promulgated in highly fluctuating social conditions in which socio-political forces and the accompanying behaviour would soon be at variance -possibly patently at variance -with the norm-formulations, and this could cause a swift lapse or supersession of the law signified in formulations.
In both of these scenarios actual behaviour will have to be assessed first in order to Here we encounter the second rub: that jurists are clearly not well placed to conduct the kind of socio-political inquiry which is necessary to acquire insight into actual social behaviour. In fact, the weakness of jurists in this field was commented on in rather forthright terms by Karl Llewellyn, a renowned jurist himself, when he noted that lawyers are admirable in word techniques and on the facts of a particular case but helpless and even childish in their social bearings when it comes to broad social facts.
The reason for this is that the activities of jurists are text-based -that is, formulationconditioned. Their attention is directed to the text, which they interpret not to the socio-political forces outside the text, which are the terrain of social scientists and astute political observers. Jurists are assigned texts-collections of legal normformulations, which they perceive to embody the law. They are not required to and are not schooled in assessing the actual sociological validity of the text; that is, in the actual effectiveness of law. They simply interpret the text to the best of their ability, assuming that it signifies actual law, regardless of whether or not deviating behaviour has reduced it to mere formulations instead of actual norms. Hence, whereas lawyers are particularly well-positioned to pronounce on the meaning of the legal norm- situations where there are material discrepancies between norm-formulations (the ideal dimension) and the actual norms (the factual dimension), which, however, might be a common and wide-ranging occurrence.
Conclusion
A clear understanding of the factual requisite of law underscores the need for continuous social observation and inquiry in order to reliably fathom the trends in social behaviour and thus the actual state of the law. If we fail to do that, we run the risk of misleading ourselves with acquiring "knowledge" of the façade of law and an apparent constitution that differs from the actual constitution and fails to provide reliable insight into the actual state of the governing process. 105 That risk looms large if the doctrine of the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution is incorrectly perceived as being descriptive or factual in nature instead of as an ideal or prescriptive doctrine.
As indicated, the legal norm-formulations -the ideal dimension of law -cannot be relied upon to access reliable knowledge of the actual state of the law. Therefore jurists should when circumstances require -when there are indications of conduct that materially deviates from the norm-formulations -seek assistance from social scientists and political observers in a joint effort to acquire reliable knowledge about the factual or real dimension of the law and so to acquire knowledge of the actual (changing) state of the law. This is particularly important in view of the fact that changes made to the constitution through direct yet often tacit conduct instead of by way of constitutional amendments (in terms of the trite formal-static view of the law and the constitution described above) by both state and non-state actors might in fact 105 Sartori 1962 Am Pol Sci J 861.
often be much more profound and significant than formal amendments to the law and the constitution. 106 Legal education should also highlight the inadequacy of the legal norm-formulations and the accompanying need for knowledge forthcoming from social inquiry.
It stands to reason that the ability of the state to effectively enforce the law through coercive measures is a crucial focus of the research on the factual dimension.
However, it would be wrong to have a limited statist focus when such research is undertaken, because non-state actors -sectors of the general public -might also be important collective agents in determining the actual state of the law. Their behaviour might help to stabilise existing law. However, it might also cause such law to lapse or even to be replaced by substituting law. The focus should therefore also be on the behaviour of non-state actors. That suggestion is specifically pertinent in weak states with ill-established and malfunctioning institutions. Grasping the actual content of law, including constitutional law, therefore requires not only analysing the norm-formulations of the formally recognised sources of the law, but more specifically social and political observation which may reveal the following:
(1) actual behaviour that closely corresponds with a legal norm-formulation, in which case the formulations reliably happen to reflect (and by implication to describe) the actual state of law; or as reflected in the norm-formulations is in part unsettled but unlike as in the second scenario, no new norm (law) has come into being. A legal lacuna opens up -that is, an area not regulated by existing legal norms.
Viewed from the perspective of the factual dimension, law, including constitutional law, is much more susceptible to the volatility of unpredictable changes and instability than what the doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy purport it to be. The doctrine holds law (and the constitution) to be formulation driven, and therefore formal-static in nature, in that the law remains essentially static until the norm-formulations (the text) are amended in terms of the prescribed amendment procedures prescribed by the constitution. Consequently, the prevalent doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy fail to account for the factual dimension which causes it (the doctrine) to obscure the inner workings of the factual dimension of law, and therefore acts as a hindrance to understanding the nature and content of (positive) law, including the constitution.
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